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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brian N. Pratt appeals from the judgment of conviction for two counts of delivery 
of a controlled substance and one count of trafficking in methamphetamine following a 
jury trial. On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred when it failed to give a 
curative instruction and denied his motion for a mistrial after one potential juror tainted 
the panel by disclosing that he knew Mr. Pratt from a previous incident when the 
prospective juror "got in trouble and [for the] same thing that [Mr. Pratt]'s in trouble for." 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Pratt was charged, by Information, with two counts of delivery of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine), one count of trafficking in methamphetamine (400 or 
more grams), and a persistent violator enhancement. 1 (R., pp.64-65.) The matter 
proceeded to a jury trial. 
The prosecutor began her voir dire by inquiring of a prospective juror who had 
responded affirmatively to a preliminary question regarding whether he knew Mr. Pratt. 
During that questioning, the potential juror explained that he knew Mr. Pratt from when 
"I got in trouble and [for the] same thing that he's in trouble for. That's how I know him." 
(Tr., p.47, Ls.1-8.) That prospective juror was then excused for cause, while Mr. Pratt's 
motion for a mistrial on the basis that the entire panel was tainted by the prospective 
juror's prejudicial statement was denied. (Supp. Tr., p.8, L.5 - p.9, L.24.) Jury selection 
then continued, with twelve jurors and one alternate selected and sworn. (Tr., p.91, 
L.19 - p.95, L.16.) 
1 The persistent violator enhancement was later withdrawn. (Tr., p.421, Ls.9-12.) 
1 
The State then presented its case against Mr. Pratt. Brett Dammon of the 
Lewiston Police Department testified that utilized Spray, an informant who was 
working to get charges of delivery of methamphetamine and a gun charge "reduced or 
not filed,"2 to conduct two controlled buys of methamphetamine from Mr. Pratt. 
(Tr., p.132, L.18 - p.151, L.1, p.182, L.8 - p.185, L.3.) During the second controlled 
buy, which occurred inside a body shop rented by Mr. Pratt, the body wire 
malfunctioned and audio of the event was unmonitored and unrecorded. (Tr., p.154, 
Ls.1-14.) After Mr. Spray left the shop, officers observed a person who was neither 
followed nor identified leave the shop on a bicycle. (Tr., p.292, Ls.6-25, p.331, L.25 
p.332, L.16.) 
Officers never observed Mr. Pratt exchange anything with the informant during 
either controlled buy. (Tr., p.186, Ls.13-24, p:195, Ls.14-21.) Following the second 
controlled buy, Mr. Pratt was arrested, and Officer Dammon applied for a search 
warrant for Mr. Pratt's shop.3 (Tr., p.154, L.1 - p.163, L.5.) Upon a search of Mr. Pratt 
and his vehicle following his arrest, officers failed to locate anything of evidentiary value, 
including any of the pre-recorded buy money. (Tr., p.199, L.3 - p.200, L.2.) 
Police then executed a search warrant on the shop. (Tr., p.163, Ls.6-8.) While 
executing the warrant, officers discovered packaging materials, a scale, and inside the 
sleeve of a black coat of unknown ownership,4 a package containing a large quantity of 
2 Mr. Spray testified that his agreement with the State provided that, if he testified 
against Mr. Pratt, "there will be no charges put on me." (Tr., p.219, L.21 - p.220, L.1.) 
3 Although Mr. Pratt leased the shop, Mr. Spray testified that he, along with many other 
people, regularly used the shop to work on their vehicles and left personal items there, 
including tools, tool boxes, and jackets. (Tr., p.239, L.15 - p.240, L.12.) Mr. Spray also 
testified that he knew the location of the shop's "hide-a-key," and had "[p]robably" used 
it to get into the shop to work on his vehicle. (Tr., p.241, L.20 - p.242, L.6.) 
4 "[M]ultiple jackets" were found in the shop. (Tr., p.204, Ls.2-4.) 
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methamphetamine.5 (Tr., p.164, L.24 p.177, L.1 ) The police did not locate any of 
the buy money from either controlled buy either at the shop, in Mr. Pratt's vehicle, or on 
Mr. Pratt. (Tr., p.205, L.17 - p.206, L.17.) 
Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Pratt guilty of all three charges. (Tr., p.414, L.9 -
p.415, L.16.) Mr. Pratt received concurrent, unified sentences of five years, with two 
yeas fixed, for the two delivery convictions, and a consecutive, unified sentence of 
twenty years, with ten years fixed, for the trafficking conviction. (Tr., p.437, L.17 -
p.438, L.19.) Mr. Pratt filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.263.) 
5 An Idaho State Police lab technician produced a report in which he concluded that the 
package recovered from the jacket contained 410.4 7 grams of a substance containing 
rnethamphetarnine. (State's Exhibit No. 1, p.1.) 
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ISSUE 
Was Mr. Pratt's constitutional right to a fair trial with an impartial jury violated when the 
district court failed to give a curative instruction and denied Mr. Pratt's motion for a 
mistrial following a potential juror's disclosure that he knew Mr. Pratt from a previous 
incident in which the prospective juror "got in trouble and [for the] same thing that 
[Mr. Pratt]'s in trouble for"? 
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ARGUMENT 
Mr. Pratt's Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial With An Impartial Jury Was Violated 
When The District Court Failed To Give A Curative Instruction And Denied His Motion 
For Mistrial Following A Potential Juror's Disclosure That He Knew Mr. Pratt From A 
Previous Incident In Which The Prospective Juror "Got In Trouble And [For The) Same 
Thing That [Mr. Pratt]'s In Trouble For" 
A. Introduction 
During voir dire, and in front of the entire jury panel, one potential juror disclosed 
that he knew Mr. Pratt from "awhile back" from an incident in which the prospective juror 
"got in trouble and [for the] same thing that [Mr. Pratt]'s in trouble for." Although that 
potential juror was excused for cause, no curative instruction was given, and Mr. Pratt's 
motion for a mistrial was denied, with the district court concluding that the potential juror 
did not "really make direct accusations against Mr. Pratt for having been involved with 
delivery of controlled substance[s] or anything of that nature." (Supp. Tr., p.9, Ls.11-
24.) Following a jury trial at which the State presented a case based almost entirely on 
the testimony of an informant who was working off two potential felony charges, 
including delivery of a controlled substance and the unlawful possession of what was 
likely a stolen firearm with an obliterated serial number by a person with a prior 
domestic violence conviction, Mr. Pratt was convicted of all three charges. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1 (a), "[a] mistrial may be declared," inter alia, 
"upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal 
defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is 
prejudicial to the defendant. . . " I.C.R. 29.1 (a).6 "The decision whether to grant a 
6 It is debatable whether "mistrial" is the proper term to use when describing a request 
for a new jury panel when the jury has not been sworn and trial has not commenced. 
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mistrial within the sound discretion of the district court ... On appellate review 
[the] inquiry is whether the event which brought about the motion for a mistrial 
constitutes reversible error when viewed in the context of the entire record." State v. 
Wachholtz, 131 Idaho 7 4, 77 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted). In considering whether 
the denial of a motion for mistrial resulted in reversible error, an appellate court may 
consider the strength of the State's case. See State v. Keyes, 150 Idaho 543, 546 
(Ct. App. 2011) (finding no error in the denial of a motion for mistrial "[i]n light of the 
overwhelming evidence" presented by the State). 
C. Mr. Pratt's Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial With An Impartial Jury Was 
Violated When The District Court Failed To Give A Curative Instruction And 
Denied His Motion For Mistrial Following A Potential Juror's Disclosure That He 
Knew Mr. Pratt From A Previous Incident In Which The Potential Juror "Got In 
Trouble And (For The] Same Thing That [Mr. Pratt]'s In Trouble For" 
The prosecutor began her voir dire by inquiring of a prospective juror who had 
responded affirmatively to a preliminary question regarding whether he knew Mr. Pratt. 
Their exchange was as follows: 
[PROSECUTOR:] Mr. Davis, without telling me exactly the nature of 
your relationship with Mr. Pratt, would that relationship cause you concern 
about sitting in this case as -
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I don't know about this case, but I got in trouble 
awhile back and [for the] same thing that he's in trouble for. That's how I 
know him. 
[PROSECUTOR:] So do you think you would be better suited for a 
different type of jury maybe -
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Maybe. 
[PROSECUTOR:] -- where you didn't know the defendant? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Maybe, yes, Ma'am. 
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(Tr., p.4 7, Ls.1-15.) At that point, the prospective juror was excused for cause, with the 
district court explaining, "Well, Mr. Davis, we'd like to as you can imagine, kind of not 
have those issues potentially cloud a jury selection process and on through deliberation. 
So this probably is a case that you should probably not sit on." (Tr., p.47, L.16 - p.48, 
L.2.) The district court did not instruct the jury to disregard the prospective juror's 
comments regarding his knowledge of Mr. Pratt from the drug world. (See, generally, 
Tr.) 
Shortly thereafter, defense counsel moved for a mistrial because the prospective 
juror's statements 
[E]ssentially tainted the entire jury pool. I don't feel that there is a limiting 
instruction that you can give to the jury that is going to un-ring that bell 
essentially saying - or the implication was that he had been in trouble for 
similar charges of delivery and that those charges and that event are how 
he knows Mr. Pratt. So the implication is that he knows him through some 
sort of controlled substance delivery or events that occurred in his legal 
case. 
(Supp. Tr., p.8, Ls.5-17.) 
In denying the motion, the district court reasoned, 
I don't believe that there have been adequate grounds shown at this time 
for the granting of a mistrial. [The prospective juror] did go far in his 
answer and if we could have perhaps controlled a little bit, but he indicated 
that he had been charged and that he knew Mr. Pratt through his prior 
action, but he doesn't really make direct accusations against Mr. Pratt for 
having been involved with delivery of controlled substance[s] or anything 
of that nature. 
So I think we can deal with it adequately through the limiting instructions 
that I'm going to be providing to the jury once sworn, and so I'm going to 
deny the motion for mistrial and we can proceed with jury selection .... 
(Supp. Tr., p.9, Ls.11-24.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that, pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,§§ 7 and 13 of 
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the Idaho Constitution, "A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to trial by an 
impartial jury." State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 69 (2011 ). The key considerations in 
determining whether, following a prejudicial statement by a prospective juror, the denial 
of a motion for mistrial was proper, appear to be whether the jurors were provided with a 
cautionary instruction to disregard the prejudicial statement and whether they learned 
anything specific from the potential juror's statement. See Ellington; State v. Kilby, 130 
Idaho 747 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Laymon, 140 Idaho 768 (Ct. App. 2004). 
In concluding that a prospective juror's statement during voir dire - that a 
defendant in a sex crime case was a pedophile - did not deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained, "The district court dismissed the potential 
juror and cautioned the remaining jurors to disregard the dismissed juror's comment. 
The district court properly cautioned the jury to disregard the comment, and we will 
presume that the jury followed the instructions given by the district court." Kilby, 130 
Idaho at 751 (citations omitted). 
In Laymon, a prospective juror in a trial for petit theft "indicated that she could not 
serve fairly and impartially because" she had been on a jury panel the preceding week 
at which a jury was being selected for a drug paraphernalia charge against the 
defendant. Laymon, 140 Idaho at 769. Although the charge had been dismissed after a 
jury was selected, the prospective juror indicated that she could not set aside her 
preconceived belief that the defendant was guilty because of her knowledge of the 
earlier charge. Id. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which the district court 
"preliminarily denied," instead providing a curative instruction that told the jury not to 
consider the prior week's charge, explained that the present charge of petit theft had 
nothing to do with drugs, that the prior week's charge was dismissed with prejudice, and 
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"you may rest assured that Mr. Laymon was not convicted of anything last week." Id. at 
769-70. 
Following the completion of voir dire, during which the biased juror was removed 
by peremptory challenge, the trial court reconsidered the motion for mistrial before 
again denying it, "determin[ing] that the curative instruction had solved any problem that 
may have been created by the potential juror's comments." Id. at 770. In concluding 
that the denial of the motion for mistrial did not deprive the defendant of his 
constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury, the Court of Appeals, after discussing 
Kilby, explained that the removal of the biased juror, the curative instruction, and the 
lack of any "evidence that the jury here did not follow the trial court's [curative] 
instructions" resulted in the juror's comments having "no continuing impact on the 
trial .... " Id. at 770-71. 
In State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011 ), the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a 
challenge to the denial of a motion for mistrial after three prospective jurors - none of 
whom ended up serving on the jury - expressed their beliefs that Mr. Ellington was 
guilty. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 68-69. In rejecting the challenge, the Court noted, "At 
worst, the jurors who actually deliberated received a second-hand opinion from those 
three prospective jurors that Mr. Ellington was guilty. They did not receive any specific 
facts as to why [these jurors held that opinion], other than that the prospective jurors 
read about it in the paper and in one instance" spoke with a member of the alleged 
victim's family about the case. Id. at 69. Additionally, after each of the three jurors 
expressed his or her opinion as to Mr. Ellington's guilt, the district court cautioned the 
panel that "the case [was] only to be decided on the evidence within the courtroom." Id. 
at 68-69. 
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Other jurisdictions have considered what type of information was presented to 
the jury panel, unsurprisingly concluding that, when little or no information of substance 
is imparted to the panel by a juror who knows, or has knowledge of, the defendant, the 
panel is not tainted. See State v. Kelley, 83 S.W.3d 36, 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (no 
error in denying motion to strike the jury panel as tainted when a juror, who expressed 
knowledge of the defendant, was "vague" about that knowledge and "did not refer to any 
prior bad acts of the defendant"); see also People v. Hutton, 633 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 (App. 
Div. 1995) (no error in denying motion to dismiss jury panel when, during voir dire, "one 
juror said that she recognized the defendant" but "did not disclose to her fellow panel 
members the circumstances from which she recognized the defendant"). The facts in 
this case are different. Even the district court, in denying the motion for mistrial, noted 
that the prospective juror "indicated that he had been charged and that he knew 
Mr. Pratt through his prior action, but he doesn't really make direct accusations against 
Mr. Pratt for having been involved with delivery of controlled substance[s] or anything of 
that nature." (Supp. Tr., p.9, Ls.15-19.) The district court's interpretation of the 
prospective juror's disclosure was unreasonable given the fact that the juror explained 
that he knew Mr. Pratt from a previous incident in which the prospective juror "got in 
trouble and [for the] same thing [Mr. Pratt]'s in trouble for."7 The "same thing" would, at 
the very least, be delivery of a controlled substance and could include trafficking. 
In a case in which the evidence supporting the most serious charge - trafficking 
in methamphetamine in an amount exceeding 400 grams and carrying a mandatory 
minimum fixed term of ten years - was entirely circumstantial and in which the bulk of 
7 As is customary, the prospective jurors had already been read the charging document, 
which included two counts of delivery of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) 
and trafficking in methamphetamine. (Tr., p.30, L.3 - p.32, L.3.) 
10 
the evidence for the remaining charges comes from a drug dealer who possessed what 
was likely a stolen firearm with no serial number despite being disqualified under federal 
law from possessing a firearm due to a domestic violence conviction8 (Tr., p.235, L.7 --
p.237, L. 7, p.184, Ls.16-24 ), it is difficult not to conclude that the prospective juror's 
sharing of information regarding his knowledge of Mr. Pratt from a previous incident in 
which the prospective juror "got in trouble and [for the] same thing he's in trouble for" 
had a continuing impact across the entire trial. As such, this Court should conclude 
that, when viewed in the context of the entire trial, the district court's denial of Mr. Pratt's 
motion for a mistrial constitutes reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Pratt respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial at which 
Mr. Pratt's constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is respected. 
DATED this 30th day of July, 2014. 
8 Under federal law, it is a felony for a person with a misdemeanor domestic violence 
conviction to possess a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). 
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